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Sub-Saharan Africa's external debt crises
By Reginald Herbold Green and Stephany Griffith-Jones1
Credit is suspicion asleep
- Henry Wallich
The bank debt crisis has been allowed to obscure another crisis 
in which indebtedness has been super-imposed on other serious 
problems: namely, that of the low-income developing countries, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.
- The Debt Crisis And The World Economy 
Commonwealth Secretariat (Lever Report)
Africa’s debt burden is now intolerable. We cannot pay.
You know it and all our other creditors know it. It is not a 
rhetorical question when I ask, should we really let our people 
starve so that we can pay our debts?
- OAU Chairman Julius K. Nyerere 
1985 Mansion House Address
The Magnitude of SSA’s External Debt Crisis
SSA does not figure prominently in world debt crisis speculation or 
negotiations seen as critical to the global financial system. The total 
external debts of SSA countries - and especially of their debts to commercial 
banks - do not place them in the first tier of debtors, a default by one of 
whom could trigger a major international banking debacle and/or a wave of
subsequent defaults.
For this reason there has been a general tendency - more marked outside SSA 
than within - to view SSA’s external debt burden as manageable, with a few 
exceptions like the Sudan and Zaire as atypical cases resulting from major
overborrowing and subsequent bad management. A parallel assumption was that 
SSA had a high net inflow on capital account plus net aid so that - with the 
odd rescheduling here and there - debts could be repaid as scheduled.
Unfortunately - above all for Africans but also for creditors - this picture
is not accurate. As the fact that two thirds of official debt renegotiations
since 1969 have been for SSA countries demonstrates^, SSA debt levels have by
no means been within servicing capacity historically. Furthermore they have
risen very rapidly since 1972: the World Bank estimates of long term official
debt amounted to $12.1 billion in 1972 and $80 billion in 1984, with debt 
service on that portion of SSA's external debt rising from 9-6% to 21.5% of 
export earnings. As a result, many SSA economies with low debt service 
ratios as recently as 1979 have high ones today.
In fact, present reported data seriously understate the size of the debt 
burden. First, World Bank data are limited to long and medium term government 
and government guaranteed debt, and revised Bank data for selected countries
suggest that adding short term debt would raise the total by perhaps one
iithird, and non-official debt would add another 5 to 10%. Second, even World 
Bank and Bank for International Settlements short term data significantly 
understate "best estimates" of debt for those major debtors for which the 
latter exist (only Nigeria in SSA), by 5 to 60%. Third, none of the
estimates include either trade arrears, unpaid local contracts which on 
payment would result in unpaid external obligations or - almost incredibly -
IMF drawings. When these are added the probable 1984 figure rises to about
$125 billion and the current total external debt of the 42 SSA economies to 
the order of $130-135 billion. This would suggest that the average true debt 
service to exports ratio was of the order of 35%. Recorded debt service
ratios do not bear this out in many cases for a grim reason - they record only
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payments actually made, therefore not only reschedulings but also arrears in
payments are not recorded leading to apparent ratios very much under their 
7true levels.
In the case of SSA suspicion is no longer asleep - most creditors want their 
money back, or at least all new purchases for cash in advance, international 
banks view almost all SSA countries as cases for reducing exposure as rapidly 
as practicable with reschedulings and limited ’new' money simply tactics on
Q
that road. Some senior IMF officials have even advocated current account
Qsurpluses m  SSA ; they have actually argued that African countries should 
adopt at present a deliberate policy to "amortise existing debt at a rate 
higher than the rate at which new debt is contracted by generating a net 
outflow of external resources for this purpose". This would imply not only 
current account surpluses, but also domestic savings larger than domestic 
investment, clearly unacceptable in countries as poor as those of SSA! The 
net inflow of borrowed resources (though still positive) is falling and 
projected to continue to do so . 10 While the Chairman of the Bank-Fund Interim 
Committee has warned11 that "insufficient financing leads to unwarranted 
exchange rate depreciation, restrictions or debt default", the record to date 
does not suggest that either governments, international agencies or commercial 
sources are making or will make available enough funds to avoid precisely 
these results.
President Nyerere's warning and question are not rhetorical. African states -
as he has noted - are too small and too poor not to pay, but most are also too
poor and too deeply enmeshed in overall economic malaise to pay either on the
terms and over the period previously envisaged or without substantial
12additional resource transfers. States will not in fact choose to pay
interest - much less repay principal - when that choice would mean cutting
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grain imports needed to avert starvation or fuel imports needed to keep the
economy operating. The case of the Sudan with a $78 million proposal for
emergency aid and $213 million interest due (after rescheduling) on $10  
13billion J of external debts (after rescheduling and excluding repayments to 
the IMF) indicates that for at least a number of African central banks the 
choice is that stark. Relatively unthreatening as it may appear at the 
international banking system level - and even there a series of ’can't pay’ 
defaults would not be so trivial as individual country figures might suggest - 
SSA’s debt problem is at least as grave as that of any other region when 
looked at in terms of burdens on a majority of the national economies.
Official Long Term Debt On The Up and Up
The most striking feature of African external debt is its very rapid increase 
since the early seventies at a rate far exceeding that of the region’s GDP or 
its exports of goods and services. The rate of expansion in the external debt 
of the African countries has since the early seventies also been more rapid 
than that for other developing countries.
Between 1972 and 1982, total African external public and publicly guaranteed 
debt outstanding is estimated to have increased sevenfold, representing an 
average annual rate of growth of about 22$. With relatively slow export 
growth, the ratio of total debt disbursed to annual exports of goods and 
services grew from 71 -3% in 1975 to 16 1.7% in 1984. Sub-Saharan Africa's 
record was even worse, with its' ratio of external debts to exports 
deteriorating from 120.0% in 1977 to 2 2 3*0$ in 1984!
This increase in the ratio of total debt disbursed to exports of goods and 
services grew significantly faster for Africa than for the rest of the
4 %
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developing countries. '^  In fact, the annual growth of African external public 
and publicly guaranteed debt between 1972 and 1 982, estimated at 22$ was 
higher than that for all developing countries estimated at 19$, and higher 
even than that of the three largest borrowers (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) 
estimated at 20$ for the period.1^
The more rapid increase in the size of African debt than of other developing
countries', as well as the far more rapid growth in African countries'
debt/exports ratio can be largely attributed to the larger relative size of
their current account deficits, particularly when measured as percentages of
exports of goods and services. Thus, for African non-oil developing countries
the median of their current account balances as percentage of their exports of
goods and services was higher than for the median for all developing countries
in every year between 1973 and 1 983; the weighted average for this ratio was
higher for Africa than for the total of developing countries in 7 out of the
1711 years after 1973*
The rapid rise in African external debt has not been accompanied by an
increase in foreign exchange reserves. In fact, it has been estimated by the
18IMF in the 1983 World Economic Outlook that for all Africa the value of 
foreign exchange reserves in 1983 was lower even in nominal terms, than it had 
been in 1973. The ratio of reserves to imports of goods and services for 
non-oil exporting developing Africa has as a consequence persistently declined 
from 18.4$ in 1973 to only a mere 5.3$ in 1983, which implies less than one 
month of imports, (clearly an extremely low ratio, which is much lower than 
that for all other developing countries). This ratio provides another 
indicator of the extreme seriousness of Africa's foreign exchange situation. 
Such a low level of foreign exchange reserves makes countries extremely 
vulnerable to unexpected changes outside their control - e.g. deterioration of
their terms of trade or serious drought - and their ability to respond to such 
unexpected problems is thus heavily dependent on external capital f l o w s . 1 ^
An important element accompanying the growth of African debt has been a change
in its structure, which corresponds to an increasing importance of private
flows in total external finance to developing countries. The proportion of 
Sub-Saharan African recorded official debt outstanding, owed to private 
creditors increased from 27% in 1972 to 40% in 1 979; this share declined 
somewhat in 1981 to 38.0%. The share of Sub-Saharan African debt owed to
private creditors was in all years at a level significantly below that for all
developing countries, and the increase in the share of debt to private 
creditors for SSA countries between 1972 and 1981 was somewhat smaller than 
that for all developing countries during the same period (54%).
What the data do not show is the rapid increase - absolutely and as a share of
debt outstanding - of IMF drawings, short term credit and of commercial 
arrears. For many Sub-Saharan economies these appear to account for up to a 
half of total debt outstanding and - even assuming a five year period for 
amortizing arrears - half of total debt service requirements. By definition 
short term credit and commercial arrears are virtually 100% obligations to 
private lenders.
The declining share of official flows towards developing countries - and 
towards African ones in particular - has been accompanied since the late
seventies by an increased share of non-concessional official flows 
(predominantly supplier credits and similar export promotion lending for 
large, capital intensive projects). As a consequence of both these trends,
the share of total African disbursed debt which had concessional terms is 
estimated to have risen first, from 46% in 1975 to 54% in 1979, but declined
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thereafter to only 36$ in 1980 and 35% in 1981. The share of ODA differs for
different categories of African countries, even though there is a common trend
for all categories of countries for ODA to decline as a proportion of total
debt since the mid-seventies. ODA debt as a proportion ot total debt
represented 53$ for low-income African countries in 1981 (down from 58.8$ in
1975). The decline on ODA as proportion of total debt appears on the face of
it to have been particularly rapid and harmful for the least developed African
countries, for which the share declined from 6 5 .6$ in 1975 to 53$ in 1981.
However, this may overstate or even misrepresent reality. An increasing
proportion of ODA to these countries is now in grant form and a substantial
volume of soft loans were retrospectively converted to grants. These factors
probably dominate the apparent shift at least for seme countries. For
non-OPEC middle income African countries, the share of ODA in total debt was
?nsomewhat smaller (48.2$ in 1978 and 34.3$ in 1981).
A final characteristic of the evolution of the structure of African debt since
the mid-1970s is that the traditional creditors of African countries (DAC
countries and capital markets, as well as multilateral organisations) have
actually increased their share of African debt rather significantly, while the
"new" creditors have decreased their share. The latter trend is particularly
clear as regards to the socialist countries (whose share in African debt is
reported to have declined from 6 .2$ in 1975 to 2.7$ in 1981) and to a lesser
21extent is also true for OPEC countries and other LDC’s. The latter trend 
contradicts increasing calls during that period for growing South-South 
cooperation in the financial sphere and is despite efforts of South economies 
such as Brazil and India to establish substantial medium term export credit 
programmes.
The changes in the structure of African debt during the 1970s - the increasing
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proportion owed to private creditors, as well as the proportion of
non-concessional debt to official creditors - have led to a significant
P?hardening in the average terms of new commitments, reflected in a sharp 
increase in the average nominal interest rate, (from 4.4$ in 1972 to 10.1% in 
1981) a shortening of the average maturities and grace periods, as well as a 
reduction of the percentage of grant element, which declined from 37 .1 % in
1972 to 6 .6% in 1981. However, for the least developed this has been partly 
offset by the increasing ratio of pure grants to concessional loans within 
ODA.
Particularly striking is the rise in average nominal interest rates paid by 
Sub-Saharan African countries which occurred during the 1982-81 period. The 
average rate rose from 3 .1% in 1972 to 5 .1$ in 1981 (and was much higher for 
several states, e.g. Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Nigeria, Tunisia). This resulted 
from three trends: the increased "privatisation" of new flows, the rapid
growth of the interest rate paid to private creditors (which more than doubled 
from its average level of 6 .7$ in 1972 to 14.3$ in 1981), and the smaller -
(but significant) rise of the average interest rate charged by official 
creditors.
Debt Service - On The Express Elevator
The large rise in the level of debt, the steep increase in interest rates paid
by African countries, and the slow growth of the value of African exports led
to a rapid increase in the debt service to exports ratio of African countries, 
which grew from 9 .2$ in 1975 to 17.3$ in 1981, that is by 88$ in six years. 
This increase is much larger than that for all other developing countries,
whose debt service grew from 9.0$ in 1975 (a similar level to that of African 
countries in that year) to 14.6$ in 1 981, a rise of 58$, which though
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significant, is less dramatic than that for African countries. The estimated
ratio of debt service to exports for low income African economies was very
high by 1981, reaching 2 2 .3% in that year, and had grown extremely rapidly
since the mid-seventies; the ratio increased nearly nine tenths between 1975
and 1981 . 1984 Sub-Saharan estimates were of the order of 25$.^ In fact
even these data do not fully portray the present and impending debt service
problem. First, drawings on pre-1981 commitments and the running out of grace
periods combined with stagnant export earnings suggest sharp increases in debt
service burdens through the rest of the 1980s even if all new borrowing were
to be concessional. Second, past debt service data for most African states
are based on actual payments made, not amounts due which are in some cases at
least 50$ higher. Third, in no case do either past data or standard
projections include either repayment or interest with respect to IMF drawings
nor amortisation of arrears. If these factors are taken into account the 1985
ratio of total debt service due to export is likely to be in the 35$ -40$
range. This is in sharp contrast to the low-income countries outside Africa,
whose debt service ratio is estimated in fact to have declined between 1975
P 4and 1981, from 18.3$ in 1975 to 16.8$ in 1981. The large size of debt
service payments in relation to the size of low-income African economies is 
also highlighted by the fact that debt service reached 7.1$ of these 
countries' GNP in 1981, a sum far higher than the 1.6$ of GNP that debt
service represented for non-African low-income countries.
Total interest payments for low-income African countries are moderate, albeit
25above those for low income Asian countries. It is the amortisation of past 
loans which mainly explains the high level of low-income African debt service 
ratios.
The issue of increased aid to low-income Afrian countries also needs to be
# *
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examined in the context of recent trends. In particular net flows to
low-income African countries through public and publicly guaranteed debt,
which had risen systematically and substantially since the early seventies
until 1980, declined quite significantly in 1981 (by 25$) to a level beneath
the 1979 level, in nominal terms. Net transfers to those countries declined
even faster, by 30$ in nominal terms, during 19 8 1. This decline in net flows
and net transfers was mainly due to a large fall in disbursements in 1 9 81,
from all official sources (except IDA whose disbursements in Africa, however,
declined thereafter) and from private sources. Perhaps of even greater
concern should be the fact that total commitments - to low-income Africa -
during 1981 fell much more sharply in nominal terms (by 42$) than
disbursements. While 1982-84 showed some recovery in nominal terms for new
official aid, to Sub-Saharan Africa the present levels are about at their
1980 -82 average in gross terms; however, because of higher amortisation nee
official flows are significantly lower in 1984-5 than in the late seventies
26and early eighties. According to recent figures, in the April 1985 IMF 
World Economic Outlook, net long-term official borrowing by Sub-Saharan 
African economies (excluding Nigeria) has fallen from an average of U.S.$4.7 
bn in 1979-81, to U.S.$3-9 bn in 1984-85, a decline of almost 20$ in nominal 
terms!
As the same IMF publication points out, official flows to Africa seem in the 
mid-eighties to have been "crowded out" by sharp increases in official flows 
to the heavily indebted middle income countries, in the context of the 
"management" of their debt crises. (Net official flows to the Western 
Hemisphere more than doubled between 1979-81 and 1984-5!). The total level of 
net disbursements from official creditors to all indebted developing countries 
is estimated by the April 1985 IMF World Economic Outlook to have remained 
fairly stable in the 1981-84 period. However, official creditors stepped up
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disbursements to middle-income countries experiencing liquidity pressures, 
often in the context of ''concerted lending" packages and rescheduling 
agreements. This shift raised the proportion of net official lending going to 
developing countries that had previously borrowed large amounts from the 
private banks. The counter-part was a decline in the share - and in the case 
of Sub-Saharan Africa and also of the nominal amount - of net official flows 
going to countries, that had not been large borrowers from the private banks. 
(It seems worth stressing that increased net official flows to large private 
bank debtors countries in Latin America did not imply increased total net 
transfers to those countries; on the contrary, there was a large net outflow
of financial resources from those countries since 1982, as total debt
servicing greatly exceeded new inflows, due to high international interest 
rates and sharp falls in new private bank lending).
Of smaller quantitative importance, but indicative also of the current very
serious difficulties of low-income African countries, is the fact that in 1981
disbursements of private non-guaranteed debt, declined so markedly that net
transfers became negative, amounting to $-49 million in 1981 and -$-74.5
million in 1 9 8 2, as disbursements declined so markedly during that year that
they fell to a level below principal repayments. For this category of flows,
net transfers (that is disbursements minus principal repayments minus interest
payments) for low-income Africa have been in fact negative during every single
year, between 1978 and 1981. Net transfers out of low-income Africa on
private non-guaranteed debt has reached US $82.3 million during the 1978-81
period.2^ By 1985 they were negative on capital account alone (i.e. excluding 
28interest).
The oroblems of reduced net flows and net transfers to African countries are 
not limited to low-income countries. Net flows to all of Sub-Saharan Africa
9
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declined in nominal terms by 22$ in 1981 and net transfers of public and
publicly guaranteed debt to those countries delined in nominal terms by 34$ in
1981; for both categories, this was the first decline since the mid-seventies,
and implied that the 1981 level was even in nominal terms, beneath the level
of flows for any year since 1977.2^ The resultant problems for the SSA lower
middle-income countries are also similar. Indeed structurally and in terms of
ability to stabilise and adjust to exogenous economc shocks SSA’s middle
(dominantly lower middle) income economies appear to be more similar to
low-income economies than to major Latin American or Asian middle income
30ones.
An Overview Of Debt Patterns
Attempts have been made to draw up multi-dimensional debt and development 
matrices for African and other Third World economies. Up to a point this is 
useful but, especially in respect to SSA, the distance it takes one is open to 
growing doubt. First, simple matrices correlating levels and/or growth rates 
of external debt with those of GDP do not seem to tell very much about recent 
performance. Second, in any simple classification system there are side 
discrepancies on results within any one class. Third, if the number of
variables is increased to cover GDP, external trade, growth uncertainty, debt 
characteristics, debt levels and growth, one rapidly arrives at matrices with 
more boxes than countries - an approach potentially useful as an organising 
framework for case studies, but not directly producing generalisable answers. 
Fourth, both the relataionships and the interpretations of them have been very 
volatile since 1973 and especially since 1979, e.g. the Ivory Coast3 ¡ and 
Malawi32 now rank as debt service problems cases with future growth mortgaged 
by past borrowing - a perception few, even among their more critical analysts, 
would have held in 1979 either as a description of present reality (which it
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was not) or of their immediate future (which it was). Similarly, 1983 studies 
still tended to classify some countries (e.g. Tanzania) as having a low debt 
service burden; however, for Tanzania including IMF obligations, taking 
account of the 1979-82 explosion in arranging and 1980-84 in using export 
credit, and assuming a five year amortisation of commercial arrears, ratios of 
up to 50Í of exports can be projected to 1990. As a result, Tanzania is no 
longer in the low debt service category.
Therefore it may be more useful to attempt a brief typology of debt levels and 
patterns related to rough GDP classification (low, lower middle and upper 
middle output per capita).
Among low per capita output African economies are three debt patterns: low
debt; high debt dominated by commercial borrowings (including banks and export 
credit); high debt dominated by arrears (at least so far as debt service 
problems are concerned), export credits and World Bank (as opposed to IDA) 
loans.
Upper Volta and the Central African Republic exemplify the first group. In 
general these economies have never been able to borrow much or to run up very 
large arrears albeit in some cases - e.g. CAR - even quite modest absolute 
debts have imposed burdens requiring reschedulings.
The next two sub-classes overlap in that arrears are endemic for both. 
However, in the cases of the Sudan, Zaire, Liberia and Malawi substantial (and 
in the event substantially non-productive as to GDP or exports) commercial 
borrowing has been central to their growing (for well over a decade in the 
first two cases) debt crises. This sub-class is characterised by one or more 
reschedulings each, and is dominated by the Sudan and Zaire whose external
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debt (including arrears and IMF drawings) as of 1985 is in excess of $20
billion - a level which should give pause to those who contend that defaults
by low income SSA economies would be trifling so far as the international
financial system is concerned. The Sudan is in arrear to the IMF by over $100 
34million.
The other low-income sub-class tends to have high debt service requirements. 
Debt service is dominated by commercial arrears, export credits, IMF drawings, 
World Bank (not IDA) loans and short term bank credits (the 'latter, in at 
least one case quite explicitly contracted because the IMF conditions
regulated 1 to 5 and 5 to 10 year, but not under one year external borrowing; 
in others because banks would extend no other type of credit). The overall 
external debt profile is sometimes (e.g. Tanzania) quite different, with long 
term soft ODA and IDA loans/credits dominant but these are not the primary 
source of the debt service problems. Examples include Tanzania, Uganda, 
Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea and Guinea Bissau. In most cases 
the problem debt has built up largely since 1979 and - except for Uganda and 
Equatorial Guinea which suffered from notoriously profligate and oppressive 
regimes and transitional problems after their fall - has in substantial part 
been incurred in vain attempts to preserve investment and production in the
face of falling earned import capacity. Debt reschedulings, to date, are
common but not universal.
Lower middle income ($400-999 per capita in 1981) fall into three somewhat 
different sub-classe: low, middle, and high, with both of the latter two
characterised by a dominance of arrears, export credits and/or banks 
borrowing. The most evident member of the first sub-class is Botswana
primarily because it has been notably successful in mobilising grant and 
consessional aid, foreign direct investment and exports and in acting promptly
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in 1981 to overcome a moderate external imbalance crisis before it could 
become serious structurally or in terms of accumulated external debt.^
The second sub-category includes Cameroon, Swaziland, Kenya, Senegal and
Nigeria. The composition of the troublesome debt varies, e.g. in the case of
Nigeria it is dominantly the $5.7 billion of commercial arrears (including $2
billion covered by bank credits which have been rescheduled and $3 to 5
billion to firms or export guarantee agencies under renegotiation since late
1983). For Kenya it is Euroloans contracted to provide balance of payments
bridging finance after coffee prices fell and those of oil rose while for
Senegal it is the growing load of offical and bank credit incurred over two
decades largely marked by very low overall and export growth. Zimbabwe
probably falls in this category today - partly because the former Smith
regime’s access to external medium and long-term credit was unusually limited;
since independence Zimbabwe was on a trajectory toward the high debt group
until 1983-84 when it adopted a highly perhaps unduly - restrictive policy on
87what types of borrowing to approve. Several reschedulings have already been 
negotiated or are under negotiation for countries in this category, and more 
over the next two to four years can reasonably be anticipated.
Cameroon is an exceptional case because its extenal debt poses no present
servicing problems and has, if anything, grown less rapidly since 1979 than
before as a combined result of prudent debt management and the buildup of oil
export. Therefore selective additional borrowing to augment growth would 
38appear feasible.
High debt lower middle income economies include the Ivory Coast, Ghana and 
Zambia. In the cases of Ghana and Zambia^^ there is a very high proportion of 
commercial arrears up to four years old, whereas the Ivoirien problem and need
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for rescheduling centres around the approximately $5 billion of 1984-88 
maturities of bank loans and export credits. Similarly the timing and 
proximate courses of debt buildup to problem levels varies; Ghana faces 
recurrent debt service problems since the middle 1960s and Zambia since 
mid-1970s, but the Ivory Coast’s arose since 1979. The Ivory Coast continued 
- indeed increased - borrowing from 1979, when real earned import capacity 
fell off, to bridge the gap until the Espoir (perhaps better titled ’Le Faux 
Espoir') offshore oilfield would restore export led growth, which it has not 
and apparently will not.
Ghana and Zambia are in fact borderline cases between this sub-class and that 
of high debt/low per capita output. Both have substantial export credit 
outstanding albeit in Zambia’s case over half the over $2 billion debt 
represents arrears, IMF drawings and commercial bank loans (in descending 
order). Both have suffered over 50Í real per capita purchasing power falls 
since 1970 - two thirds or more as a direct result of external factors in the 
Zambian case - and have had a series of partial debt restructurings and 
reschedulings. Neither the late 1983 recovery of cocoa prices nor any likely 
level of copper/cobalt prices can render rescheduling more than a short term 
palliative for these economies without substantial growth of export volume 
which has been sliding in Ghana for almost twenty years and in Zambia since 
the mid-1970s. By 1984 the World Bank had ’downgraded” Ghana (and Kenya) to 
its low income category.
Xf upper middle income is defined as over $1,000 per capita GDP there are only 
two cases in SSA - Mauritius and Gabon. Both are now middle debt service 
burden economies (above average in relation to GDP but below in respect to 
exports). In each case the debt is largely commercial plus non-concessional 
export credits. However, there is an historic difference. Gabon's debt
*
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buildup came primarily in the late 1970s since when a draconic stabilisation
programme has averted a fullscale debt crisis, at the cost of radically
reduced growth and investment. Mauritius debt buildup began with the 
subsidence of the 1975 sugar boom and was used largely to sustain government 
real wage and investment increases into the 1980s. Its lower GDP, poor export 
prospects and high unemployment levels make its ability to operate a classic 
stabilisation more problematic than Gabon's.
Prospects Or Portents?
The prospects for improved net capital inflows are not good. Net private 
capital flows to low income SSA fell from $2.7 billion in 1980 to $1.1 billion 
in 1983 and are projected to be negative on the order of $1 billion a year 
over 1985-87.^ Net official inflows were $8 . 3  billion a year over 1980-82 
and were projected, as of late 1984, at $6 billion a year over 1985-87. Net
IMF drawings averaged $0.8 billion a year in the earlier period; over 1985-87
gross drawings are not readily projectable, and gross repayments scheduled are 
of the order of $1.25 billion a year.
In sum, the World Bank projections show a decline of annual net inflow on 
capital account of 54Í between 1980 -82 and 1985-87 ($10 .8 to $5 . 0  billion) 
before allowing for inflation or the probable swing from net IMF drawings to 
net repayments to the Fund. The basic cause is a 200Í increase (from $2.7 to 
$8 billion) in annual amortisation, since the gross inflow estimates are 
roughly static (i.e. 20Í lower in constant price and about 30% lower in per 
capita constant price terms). This stark set of data indicate that both 
rescheduling and new money are needed urgently.
The critical role of the capital account - and therefore of the debt burden -
is enhanced by the nature of the 'typical' SSA economy's economic malaise. 
This is inability to use or to maintain existing production and supporting
service capacity - including export capacity - because of inability to finance 
imports. As imports have in fact fallen - rapidly in most cases since 1980 - 
the basic origin of the constraint is the availability of foreign exchange. 
Increased debt service burdens now threaten to worsen that constraint on 
production, including that of exports. When the extra import costs of the 
1982-1985 drought cycle are added, it becomes clear that for many SSA 
economies the choices are economic collapse and human starvation today with 
default tomorrow, default today with little chance of recovery (as the costs
in terms of gross inflows would often equal exceed savings on gross interest
and amortisation) or additional transfers plus rescheduling to finance both
increased capacity utilisation and export buildup and to lay a more plausible 
foundation for subsequent debt servicing.
It may be useful to indicate the annual orders of magnitude for a five year 
stabilisation - recovery - initial structural ajdustment programme for the 42 
countries of SSA. Extrapolating from known draft programmes yields a total of 
the order of $7,500 million a year for basically operating inputs, spares and 
rehabilitation plant-machinery-vehicles and initial structural adjustment gap 
filling.
This total is in addition to present net transfers which, as of late 1984, the
41World Bank estimated at $5,000 million a year over 1985-87. While
considerable attention has since been focused on emergency relief and the 
World Bank's $1,000 million special Facility, for Sub-Saharan Africa the 
question of how any sum remotely like $7,500 million a year could be built up 
has not been much addressed.
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In principle, to reach such a target, five components could be envisaged:
1. Raising the World Bank Special Facility to $1,500 million a year;
2. A target of $750 million a year additional funding for the African
Development Fund and IFAD;
3 . A target of at least $2,000 million a year additional bilateral finance
(of which at most about a quarter could be with grace periods less than
five and total duration of under fifteen years);
4. $1,750-2,000 million a year rescheduling/rollover of official and
commercial loans - with repayment phased over, say, fifteen years 
following a five year grace period.
425. $1,000-1,250 million new drawings of IMF funds to offset the $1,250
repayments now scheduled - albeit preferably paralleled by a new
4Rinterest subsidy facility for low income SSA countries. J
To state these orders of magnitude may well be to state why an overall 
stabilisation-rehabilitation-structural ajdustment programme for SSA is not 
achievable. It is, however, also to pose the debt burden and net inflow 
requirements of such a programme in a way that illustrates what needs to be 
attempted. The only evident way to reduce the target would be to shift say 
the 20 to 25Í of present aid clearly tied to postponable projects (e.g. 
airport, capitals, additions to unutiliseable production and unmaintainable 
infrastructure) to programme support. That would reduce the target to $5,500 
million a year - $3 , 0 0 0  million rescheduling/rollover and $2,500 million new 
money.
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The sketch also indicates what kind of debt rescheduling is needed: five years 
substantial relief on principal, plus consolidation of arrears of interest and 
principal at interest rates (at the most) not above those currently paid (or 
unpaid) and with 15 (say 10 to 20 depending on the country) years subsequent 
repayment; plus new IMF drawings (useable on this scale by poorer countries 
only if interest subsidies can be reinstated) effectively to provide interim 
circulating trade finance until recovery puts suspicion back to sleep and 
normal short term trade and bank credit reemerges.
The costs of the absence of such an approach of this approximate order of
magnitude are those which Dutch Finance Minister and Interim Committee
45Chairman Onno Ruding has made:
1 . indequate financing creates cumulative self generating devaluation (and 
inflation), very tight trade and payment restrictions, and/or default;
2. present African austerity (stabilistation in name) programmes are often 
so tight as to reduce rather than increase incentives and abilities to 
produce or invest.
In human terms for Africans the costs will include continued economic 
regression - and accompanying increased political and social instability (or 
worse) - for most, severe deprivation for a majority - and may contribute to 
the premature death of hundreds of thousands a year.
Large increases in new flows and significant reductions in debt servicing for 
Sub-Saharan African countries would be a necessary, but clearly not a 
sufficient condition for effective rehabilitation and growth in those
$
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economies. Major changes in policies pursued by African governments and in 
attitudes of international institutions would also be required, but these 
would clearly be made far more feasible in the context of significantly 
enhanced net financial transfers to Africa.
For example, it has increasingly been argued that, particularly for low-income 
African countries it would be far more appropriate to link discussions of 
their stabilisation programmes with an evaluation of medium-term needs, in the 
context of their development programme. This would clearly imply procedural 
changes (already adopted in the case of a few African countries), whereby 
emerging debt and short-term adjustment problems would be discussed first in 
the broad context of a donor group, aid consortium or consultative group, with 
the World Bank clearly playing an important role. Such a forum would stress 
the medium and long-term financial needs of the countriesr development 
programme; once those needs were approved, short-term stabilisation and debt 
rescheduling could be discussed in the context of this medium-term programme. 
This could imply a simplification of procedures in debt rescheduling, for 
example by making widespread use of multi-year rescheduling (at present 
Ecuador is the only country that has been granted a multi-year rescheduling by 
the Paris Club, even though there is widespread agreement that many African 
countries clearly would benefit from it).
Although changes in the procedure to integrate short-term stabilisation with 
medium-term development and debt rescheduling with new flows can be made even 
without large increases in funding, clearly such changes are more likely to be 
implemented and to be more effective if net transfers of financial resources 
to Sub-Saharan Africa are significantly higher than at present.
Along the same line, forms of adjustment to disequilibria in African countries
*
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to current account deficit which use more supply - enhancing and more gradual 
than the current approach being suggested by official international 
institutions crucially (though clearly not exclusively) depend on 
significantly greater availability of net foreign funding.
% * Table 1
Sub-Saharan African External Debt - IMF Estimates
A. Amounts 1977-1984 (Amounts in USA $ Billions)
1975 1977 1979 1981 1982 1983 1984
Medium and Long Term 15.3 2 3 . 6 38.4 51.7 61.4 64.8 6 8 . 8
% Share Therein
Bilateral (17) (18) (18) (2 0 ) (19) (2 1 ) (2 2 )
Multilateral (44) (41) (40) (41) (43) (44) (45)
Financial Institutions (16) (2 0 ) (2 6 ) (27) (2 8 ) (27) (25)
Others (23) (2 0 ) (15) (13) (9) (9) (8 )
Short Term 0 .1 1 . 2 1.5 2 . 2 2.5 6.1 4.8
Arrears 1.5 1.5 2 . 0 4.6 9.7 9.3 9.4
IMF Credit 1.7 1.3 1.5 2 . 0 3.4 4.0 5.1
Total 18 .6 27.6 43.6 60.5 75.0 84.1 88 .1
3. Ratios 1977-1986 (Percentages)
1977 1979 1981 1982 1983 1984 1986'
To Exports J 120 .0 141.7 168.3 199.8 2 1 6 . 8 2 2 3 . 2 230.9
To GDP 33.8 36.7 43.5 49.7 54.2 72.6 6 8 . 0
C. Debt Service 1980- 1986 (Amounts in USA $ Billions)
1980 1981 1982 1983 19842 19852 1986'
Interest 2 . 6 2.7 3.2 3.5 4.3 4.8 4.6
Amortisation 2.9 3.1 3.0 3.9 5.7 6 . 2 6 . 2
Total 5.5 5.8 6 . 2 7.4 10 .0 11 .0 10 .8
% of Exports 9.5 12.3 15.5 2 0 . 6 2 6 . 2 28.1 2Ó .0
D. Average Terms New Public Sector Debt Commitments 1975-1982
1975 1977 1979 1980 1981 1982
Interest (%) 5.6 5.6 7.6 7.4. 9.5 7.7
Maturity (Years) 19.9 18.1 15.5 17.6 15.3 19.9
Grace (Years) 5.2 4.8 4.5 4.8 4.3 5.0
Grant Element (?) 3 0 . 0 29.1 17.5 2 0 . 2 8.4 19 .6
Of which Low Income Africa
Interest (%) 4.2 3.8 5.2 4.5 4.8 4.2
Maturity (Years) 23.7 23.7 20.7 2 2 . 8 25.1 28.1
Grace (Years) 6 .1 5.8 5.5 5.8 6.1 6 . 6
Grant Element (%) 41.8 44.0 34.1 40.0 40.3 45.9
Notes:
1. 1 9 7 5, 1977, 1979 estiamted by present authors.
2. Projections. In respect to debt service do not include -
especially for 1 9 85, 1986 - impact new borrowing, rescheduling, 
failure to pay 1984 debt service in full.
3. Goods and Services.
Sources: Adapted from E. H. Brau, "External Debt Management in the
African Context", paper for IMF/AACB Symposium, Africa And
The International Monetary Fund, 1985, based on IMF World
Economic Outlook, 1983; World Bank International Debt Tables; 
IMF Staff Estimates.
Table 2
Sub-Saharan Africa, composition of total public and publicy guaranteed debt 
outstanding (Í)
1972 1976 1979 1981
Total debt
(inc. undisbursed) 100 .0 100 .0 100 .0 1 00 .0
Official creditors 73.0 69.5 60.0 62.0
Private creditors 27.0 31.5 40.0 3 8 . 0
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables, First Supplement External Debt
of Developing Countries. May 1983.
Table 3
All developing countries, composition of total public and publicly 
guaranteed debt outstanding
1972 1976 1979 1981
Total debt
(inc. undisbursed) 100 .0 100 .0 100 .0 100 .0
Official creditors 6 5 .0 59.0 46.5 46.0
Private creditors 35.0 46.0 53.5 54.0
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables, First Supplement, op cit.
Table 4
Average Terms of Public Debt New Commitments for Afria , South of
the Sahara 1972-81
1972 1976 1978 1980 1981
Interest (%) 
All creditors 4.4 5.4 6 .6 7.2 10.1
Official creditors 3.1 3.4 3.8 3.8 5.1
Private creditors 6.7 7.8 9.3 12.5 14.3
Maturity (years) 
All creditors 20.5 18.7 16 .6 18.5 15.9
Official creditors 2 7 . 8 27.2 25.1 25.0 25.2
Private creditors 8.3 8.4 8.1 8.7 8 . 2
Grace period (in years) 
All creditors 5.9 5.1 4.7 5.0 4.4
Official creditors 7.8 7.0 6.5 6.4 6 . 0
Private ceditors 2 . 6 2.7 2.9 2.9 3.0
Grant element (in %) 
All creditors 37.1 30.4 23.3 22.4 6 . 6
Official creditors 52.1 49.6 45.0 44.7 35.7
Private creditors 11.9 7.5 1 .8 11 .8 17.7
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables , First Supplement, op cit.
Table 5
African debt, disbursed, end-year, by source of lending
(Percentage of total debt)
1975 1977 1979 1980 1981
1. DAC countries and cap­ 64.0 6 5 . 8 6 8 . 6 67.6 67.2
ital markets, of which ODA 19.1 15.5 14.4 14.2 13-3
Exports credits 28.4 33.0 35.6 3 6 . 2 3 6 . 8
2 . Multilateral organis­
ations 10 .6 13.3 13.9 15 .0 15.4
3. CMEA countries 6 . 2 3.9 2.9 2 . 6 2.7
4. OPEC 11.9 11.4 9.5 9.8 1 0 .2
5. Other LDC's 5.2 4.7 4.5 4.4 3.9
6 . Unspecified and adjustment 2 .1 0.9 0 . 6 0 . 6 0 . 6
Total 100 .0 100 .0 100 .0 100 .0 100 .0
Total disbured debt
(U.S. $ Billion)
29.6 48.8 77.5 86 .1 95.2
Source: UNCTAD Secretariat 1983, based on information supplied by the
World Bank and OECD.
Table 6














External debt as % of 
GNP 50.8 45.3 46.9 6 1 .8***
Exports of goods 
and services 300.3 116 .6 170 .2 215.8
Debt service ratio 2 2 . 8 19.1 2 2 .6 24.3***










Percentage of debt owed 
to official creditors 82.9* 16.4 39.0 49.3
Reserves as % of imports 
of goods and services 14.8 17.2 16.1 9.7
Percentage of financing of 
current account deficit and 
reserve accretion from 
private creditors (net) 3 53 29 16
* Including China and India 
** Includes some middle-income countries 
*** Relative to other country groups the Africa figures are probably 
understated because short term credit, in general and non-bank 
commercial credit in particular plus visible and invisible 
commercial arrears which are very imperfectly caught by international 
(and most national) recording systems are proportionately much higher 
in SSA than elsewhere.
From G. K. Helleiner, "Aid And Liquidity: The Neglect of SSA And 
Others Of The Poorest In The Emergent International Monetary System",
Journal of Development Planning, 1985.
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, 1984.
Table 7
Revised Estimate 1984 SSA External Debt
IMF Estimate Revision Total
Long and Medium 6 8 . 8 10.3 79.1
Short 4.8 21.6 26.4
Arrears 9.4 5.6 15.0
IMF 5.1  5.1
Total 8 8 .1 34.8 125.6
Notes
1. Unrecorded long and medium term estimated at 15$ of recorded concentrated 
in government guaranteed and private sector non-guaranteed credits.
2. Short term credit estimated at 25$ total long and short term. Includes 
revolving credits, supplier credits not routed via banks, excludes normal 
commercial up to 90 days.
3. Based on fragmentary data. Includes overdue open book credit, commercial 
bills payable, overdue acceptances, blocked invisibles transfers and 
externally payable portion of unpaid domestic contracts and loans.
4. Both Latin American and African debt crises exercises indicate that prior 
to crises and reschedulings very large sums of debt and arrears are not 
recorded. In the case of Nigeria pre-crisis total debt estimates were of 
the order of 40-50$ of actual debt (including arrears and subsequently 
rescheduled short term bank credits).
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Notes
1. This paper is based on a study done by the co-authors for the African 
Centre for Moentary Studies under an UNCTAD Consultancy - African
External Debt and Development: A Review and Analysis, IDS (Sussex), 1984 
(Xerox). It draws on information supplied by the African participants at 
the ACMS - Bank of Tunisia seminar External Debt Problems Of African 
Countries In the 1980Ts held in Tunis in September 1983, as well as on 
information provided by UNCTAD and OECD.
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debt service without breaking programme restrictive clauses.
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'to be an underestimate). See Appendix 1.1, Commonwealth Group of
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Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1984.
6. See Table 7.
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rescheduling it would have been 44Í and since no rescheduling offsets 
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Government Economic Report, Lilongwe, 1985 cited by M. Holman, "Economy", 
Financial Times, 16-IV-85.
8 . A senior official of a major international bank indicated privately that
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Nigeria, Cameroon. Only in the last case was it willing to consider net 
new lending and in the first it hoped to recover its outstanding credit 
at the first upswing. He saw no promising markets to enter albeit he 
indicated that in the cases of Botswana and Gabon, size, not risk, 
considerations dominated that view.
9. See R. J. Bhatia and A. Tahari, "External Debt Management and
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